By JC Gaillard, Waipapa Taumata Rau, Aotearoa, University of the Philippines Resilience Institute

Disaster risk reduction, as a field of praxis, exists on the premise that there is such a universal thing as a disaster. An absolute truth that has global relevance. The problem is that this truth draws upon one single form of knowledge, that is, Eurocentric knowledge, informed by one particular set of ontologies and epistemologies. As a result, disaster risk reduction is an illusion devised in support of the imperialist project of the West; one that needs to be challenged so that knowledge can reclaim its true local dimension and value.

Knowledge is indeed different from truth. Knowledge refers to the facts we are aware of and the skills we acquire through experience and sharing. It reflects our diverse interpretations of the world that surrounds us, that is, in Nietzsche’s (1922b, p. 13) terms: ‘Soweit überhaupt das Wort Erkenntniss Sinn hat, ist die Welt unerkennbar: aber sie ist anders deutbar, sie hat keinen Sinn hinter sich, sondern unzählige Sinne. – Perspektivismus’[1]. Truth, rather, carries a pure and absolute meaning. Therefore, knowledge is fundamentally plural, while truth entails universality. The imperialist and hegemonic agenda of Western science has made searching for the latter an absolute necessity; one that has obscured the inherent plurality of knowledge (Nietzsche, 1882, 1887, 1922a).

As a result, the truth that there is such a thing as a disaster that applies universally across diverse societies and cultures has been accepted as common sense. It has been supported by academic narratives and paradigms, which, although diverse and conflicting in many ways, have never challenged the ontological existence of the concept of disaster (Gaillard, 2021). Even though a disaster is inherently the perspectival interpretation of harm, suffering and hardship that is deeply dependent on an array of economic, social and cultural factors that vary from one individual to another or across social groups and societies. Nonetheless, thresholds of harm, suffering and hardship have been drawn by scholars and organisations in hope of coming up with universal standards, whether quantitative (e.g. a certain number of people killed or affected) or qualitative (e.g. that people are supposedly not able to deal with the impact by themselves).

Such universal truth is however an illusion. As Nietzsche (1887, p. 127) emphasises, ‘Es giebt nur ein perspektivisches Sehen, nur ein perspektivisches Erkennen; und je mehr Affekte wir über eine Sache zu Worte kommen lassen, je mehr Augen, verschiedne Augen wir uns für dieselbe Sache einzusetzen wissen, um so vollständiger wird unser Begriff dieser Sache, unsre Objektivität sein’[2]. Searching for a definite objectivity or an absolute truth is thus an illusion; an illusion devised for a particular purpose, that is, to sustain a particular agenda meant to be definitive and universal as per the ambitions of Western science (Nietzsche, 1921, 1922a). Nietzsche (1922b, p. 13) adds that ‘Unsere Bedürfnisse sind es, die die Welt auslegen; unsere Triebe und deren Für und Wider. Jeder Trieb ist eine Art Herrschsucht, jeder hat seine Perspektive, welche er als Norm allen übrigen Trieben aufzwingen möchte’[3]. Therefore, it is through the alleged existence of such absolute truth that the imperialist project of the West has acquired its legitimation and universality: ‘im Glauben gerade an die Wahrheit sind sie, wie Niemand anders sonst, fest und unbedingt’[4] (Nietzsche, 1887, p. 168).

It is in this perspective that the seemingly universal standards applied to defining what a disaster is have informed the praxis of disaster risk reduction. They have supported normative policies and actions, whether hazard-focused and top-down or vulnerability-driven and bottom-up (and all sorts of combinations of both), that have been imposed all around the world as the ultimate solution to what we call disasters (Gaillard, 2021). International treaties and frameworks have been instrumental in pushing this agenda across cultures and societies, whether they fit traditional and local approaches to governance or not. For this reason, polices and actions for disaster risk reduction, in all their diversity, have largely been an instrument for the West to support an imperialist agenda that has prolonged centuries of colonisation (Bankoff, 2001).

It is now time to reconsider such normative policies and actions to reduce disaster risk. It is also time to challenge the absolute and universal nature of Western concepts, theories and methodologies that sustain these policies. It is thus time to reclaim the real value of knowledge, in all its diversity and plural perspectives. It is ultimately time to look at how people interpret harm, suffering and hardship from their own perspectives, that are, perspectives that reflect their own understanding of the world.

Of course, these perspectives will necessarily be hybrid rather than essentialist and nativist. They will consider and integrate the legacy of pre-Western colonial trade routes and migrations, centuries of Western colonialism as well as contemporary global exchanges of information. These multiple perspectives will be hybrid in that these different heritages combine and co-exist in unique fluid and constantly changing forms around the world (Gaillard, 2023). A pluriverse, in Mignolo’s (2000) and Escobar’s (2018) terms, or a Tout-Monde, in Glissant’s (1997), where there is no definite truth but culturally grounded, unique and interacting forms of knowledge in interpreting harm, suffering and hardship. It is essential to reclaim these diverse forms of knowledge to inform culturally grounded actions to reduce what we call disaster risk.

References:

1. Bankoff G. (2001) Rendering the world unsafe: ‘Vulnerability’ as a Western discourse. Disasters 25(1): 19-35.
2. Escobar A. (2018) Designs for the pluriverse: radical interdependence, autonomy, and the making of the worlds. Duke University Press, Durham.
3. Gaillard J.C. (2021) The invention of disaster: power and knowledge in discourses on hazard and vulnerability. Routledge, Abingdon.
4. Gaillard J.C. (2023) The Tout-Monde of disaster studies. Jàmbá: Journal of Disaster Risk Studies 15(1): https://jamba.org.za/index.php/jamba/article/view/1385
5. Glissant E., 1997, Traité du Tout-Monde: Poétique IV, Gallimard, Paris.
6. Mignolo W.D. (2000) Local histories/global designs: coloniality, subaltern knowledges and border thinking. Princeton University Press, Princeton.
7. Nietzsche F. (1882) Die fröhliche wissenschaft. Verlag von Ernst Schmeitzner, Chemnitz.
8. Nietzsche F. (1887) Zur genealogie der moral: eine streitschrift. Verlag von C.G. Naumann, Leipzig.
9. Nietzsche F. (1921) Ueber das pathos der wahreit. In Friedrich Nietzsche: gesammelte werker – Vierter band. Musarion Verlag, Munich, pp. 139-147.
10. Nietzsche F. (1922a) Ueber wahrheit und lüge im aussermoralischen sinne. In Friedrich Nietzsche: gesammelte werker – Sechster band. Musarion Verlag, Munich, pp. 75-99.
11. Nietzsche F. (1922b) Der wille zur macht: versuch einer umwerthung aller werthe – Drittes buch: princip einer neuen werthsetzung. In Friedrich Nietzsche: gesammelte werker – Neunzehnter band. Musarion Verlag, Munich, pp. 1-99.

[1] ‘In so far as the word “knowledge” has any meaning, the world is knowable; but it is interpretable otherwise, it has no meaning behind it, but countless meaning – Perspectivism’. From the English translation by W. Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale published by Vintage Books in 1968.

[2] ‘Perspectival seeing is the only kind of seeing there is, perspectival ‘knowing’ the only kind of ‘knowing’; and the more feelings about a matter which we allow to come to expression, the more eyes, different eyes through which we are able to view this same matter, the more complete our ‘conception’ of it, our ‘objectivity’, will be’. From the English translation by D. Smith published by Oxford University Press in 1996.

[3] ‘It is our needs that interpret the world; our drives and their For and Against. Every drive is a kind of lust to rule; each one has its perspective that it would like to compel all the other drives to accept as a norm’. From the English translation by W. Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale published by Vintage Books in 1968.

[4] ‘It is in their very belief in truth that they are more inflexible and absolute’. From the English translation by D. Smith published by Oxford University Press in 1996.

* ‘One does not wish to know the truth, but one wishes to believe in the truth’. Our translation from the French version published in Europe, No. 141, in 1934.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the author/s and do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of AIDMI.