By Nishara Fernando, University of Colombo, Sri Lanka

The disaster risk reduction (DRR) mechanism in Sri Lanka has a very short history. The need for organised and systematic disaster management arose because of the massive destruction and loss of life caused by the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami. Local level administrative bodies such as District Secretariats[1], Divisional Secretariats [2] as well as local authorities including Provincial Councils[3] and Local Councils[4] managed disasters and their effects prior to the tsunami. In 2005, the National Council for Disaster Management and the Disaster Management Centre were established as per the Disaster Management Act No. 13 of 2005 (DMC, 2005). However, due to a lack of financial means and technical expertise, the DMC had to obtain the support of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to establish key policies and practices of the center. The involvement of UNDP in building such policies and strategies of DMC can be identified as the first instance that the Western DRR dogma was introduced to the local disaster management system. UNDP took measures to provide technical expertise to the centre based on the Yokohama Strategy and Plan of Action for a Safer World adopted at the World Conference on Natural Disaster Reduction held in Yokohama, Japan in May 1994 (IPS, 2007). Moreover, DMC adopted all key international DRR approaches including the latest Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (SFDRR), 2015-30 promoted by the United Nations.

This Western dogma of DRR has served Sri Lankans since 2005 and has become instrumental in mitigating disasters and reducing various hazards. Nevertheless, it is evident that the existing disaster risk reduction mechanism is infested with short comings (Abdee et al., 2021). Most noteworthy is its failure to provide lasting, sustainable solutions to risks and challenges faced by communities’-especially vulnerable groups such as older people, women, children, and people with disabilities (Siriwadana et al., 2018).

During a conversation with a high-ranking official of the Galle District Secretariat, the official expressed concerns about the relocation process and its negative impacts on children. According to the official, “The relocation process was solely focused on building houses and providing food for the displaced. Everything else received less attention from everyone.” He further explained that it took both the government and non-governmental organisations over four months to establish a system for educational programmes to benefit the children. Even after this period, the children had to face numerous difficulties. As the official stated, “For a long period children had to study in extremely hot tents, there was a shortage of an adequate number of teachers, and they also lacked sports equipment and other resources.”

The Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) decided to involuntarily relocate communities that had either lost their houses due to the Indian Ocean Tsunami or communities living within the “No Construction Zone” (Buffer Zone) declared by the GOSL as a risk reduction method. Nevertheless, the relocation process was considered a failure as it did not incorporate the needs and views of communities (Fernando, 2010). Findings from numerous studies reveal that nearly two thirds of originally relocated communities have moved back to the coastal region to overcome challenges at relocation settlements (Fernando, 2013). These include the collapse of livelihood strategies due to the distance to workplaces (e.g. fisherman to the harbour), lack of access to common assets, clashes with host communities, substandard infrastructure and housing, increased housing expenses etc.

According to a relocatee who transitioned from a government-built relocation site, the experience of living at the relocation site was fraught with challenges. The relocatee, identifying as a fisherman, conveyed, “Life at the relocation site was full of challenges as I was a fisherman and the site was located approximately 9.00 km away from the sea. I had to rely on public bus services, enduring early morning travels, to reach the coast. It was impractical and inconvenient. I attempted to explore alternative job opportunities; however, the area offered limited employment prospects. Additionally, conflicts frequently arose with the host communities concerning issues such as water usage, access to playgrounds, and space for cemeteries. These conflicts created immense tension and discomfort. As a result, after residing in the community for over a year, I made the decision to return to our previous location.”

Relocation has also been used as a DRR strategy during large-scale landslides that took place in the Aranayaka area in the Kegalle district. In these instances, relocated communities were compelled to give up their homes and adjoining land which were used to cultivate crops such as tea, beetle-nut, rubber, etc. As a result, the expenses of households increased while their income decreased significantly. Moreover, another shortcoming of the existing DRR mechanism is the inadequacy of funds allocated to build owner-driven housing. Instead of providing equivalent or adequate compensation for previous housing of displaced communities, a fixed amount is provided to all displaced communities which is often insufficient to build a new house.

As discussed previously, the DRR mechanisms in Sri Lanka are not community based in nature. Failure to integrate the actual needs and wants of affected communities leads to the failure of risk reduction strategies and increases the vulnerability of displaced communities. As a result, communities affected by hazards are entrapped in a vicious cycle of poverty which is often intergenerational. The top-down approach further contributes to mismanagement of funds, duplication of DRR activities, implementation of ad-hoc DRR methods and practices etc. Another key shortcoming of the DRR strategy is the lack of coordination between administrative bodies involved in DRR, especially at the local level. As a result, such strategies and practices developed at national level often fail to be implemented at the local level resulting in greater vulnerability of communities.

In this light, it is important that the GOSL builds a postcolonial DRR strategy that has the capacity to address the shortcomings of the current DDR mechanism. The DRR strategy should inculcate a community centric approach that allows national level policies and practices to be enriched by local-level wants and needs in order to achieve greater success in addressing the true needs of the communities affected by hazards and disasters. Furthermore, DRR practices such as relocation should be evaluated and adopted in a case sensitive manner to provide more comprehensive and sustainable solutions to different vulnerable groups.

References:

1. Abdeen, F. N., Fernando, T., Kulatunga, U., Hettige, S., & Ranasinghe, K. A. (2021). Challenges in multi-agency collaboration in disaster management: A Sri Lankan perspective. International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, 62, 102399.
2. Disaster Management Center (2015). DMC Profile. Disaster Management Center, Sri Lanka. https://www.dmc.gov.lk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=72&Itemid=234&lang=en#:~:text=In%20July%202005%20the%20Disaster,Prime%20Minister.
3. Fernando, N. (2010). Forced Relocation after the Indian ocean tsunami 2004 case study of vulnerable population in three relocation settlements in Galle, Sri Lanka.
4. Fernando, N., & Punchihewa, A. G. (2013). Relocating the displaced strategies for sustainable relocation. Colombo, Sri Lanka: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.
5. Institute of Policy Studies (Colombo, Sri Lanka). Disaster Management Policy and Practice in Sri Lanka: Sharing Lessons Among Government, Civil Society and Private Sector. Institute Policy Studies, 2007.
6. Siriwardana, C. S., Jayasiri, G. P., & Hettiarachchi, S. S. L. (2018). Investigation of efficiency and effectiveness of the existing disaster management frameworks in Sri Lanka. Procedia Engineering, 212, 1091-1098.

[1] The District Secretariat which is headed by the District Secretary is the superior administrative units to the Divisional Secretariat.

[2] The Divisional Secretariats (DS) are the grass root level administrative units which deliver more than 90 percent of the government services to the citizen. There are 320 DS divisions in Sri Lanka.

[3] Provincial Councils were set up in Sri Lanka for the first time in terms of 13th Amendment to the Constitution and the Provincial Councils Act. No. 42 of 1987. The Council functions as the legislature of the province and has power to pass a statute on any subject assigned to the provincial council.

[4] Local government is the third and lowest level of government in Sri Lanka, after the central government and provincial councils. The local government bodies are collectively known as local authorities. They are responsible for providing a variety of local public services including roads, sanitation, drains, housing, libraries, public parks and recreational facilities.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the author/s and do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of AIDMI.